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During the Ebola-crisis 2014, states have widely ignored the 
measures recommended by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and have interfered in the fight against the disease. 
This blogpost suggests ways to address shortcomings in 
states’ adherence to the law.
Global Health Crisis and the World Health Organization
Globalization facilitates the worldwide spread of diseases. 
Recently, Ebola throughout Western Africa, and Zika in Latin 
America and the Caribbean gave rise to fears in countries far 
removed from the affected region. The international 
community relies on the World Health Organization (WHO) 
to combat diseases. The WHO is tasked to attain the highest 
possible level of health for all peoples (art. 1 WHO-
Constitution). Even tough law itself does not make anyone 
healthier, the WHO has some legal means at hand to work in 
that direction. While some means at hand are rather 
common or even unexciting , WHO-law provides one very 
unique feature: the WHO has the authority to issue legally 
binding regulations (art. 21 WHO-Constitution). The kicker is 
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the entry-into-force: A convention adopted under this 
provision enters into force for all members after due notice 
has been given of its adoption (art. 22 WHO-Constitution). 
The only way for a state to opt out of such a binding 
agreement is to notify the Director-General of WHO of the 
state’s rejection or its reservation.
WHO’s International Health Regulations
This is the legal basis for the International Health 
Regulations of 2005 (IHR), which entered into force in 2007. 
Their purpose is to “prevent, protect against, control and 
provide” a response to any “public health emergency of 
international concern” (art. 2 IHR, PHEIC). The IHR are 
guided by the thought to “avoid unnecessary interference 
with international traffic and trade.”
Ebola in 2014  as well as Zika in 2016 were both regarded as 
PHEIC: they were understood as extraordinary events which 
constitute a public health risk to other States through the 
international spread of diseases and potentially require a 
coordinated international response (art. 1 IHR).
During a PHEIC the WHO’s Director-General may issue 
temporary recommendations. However, due to their 
character as “non-binding advice” (art. 1 IHR), states widely 
ignored those temporary recommendations issued during 
the Ebola-crisis, with devastating effects.
Taking the straight-forward-approach: Modifying the IHR
The easiest way is, obviously, to modify the IHR. Only one 
single word needs to be chopped: Art. 1 IHR could be 
modified to the extent that temporary recommendations are 
defined as “binding” measures. In light of recent state 
BACK TO TOP 
practice this approach seems, however, to be out of 
question. Thus, it is advisable to consider measures less 
intrusive on state sovereignty.
Taking a winding approach: Interpreting the IHR
In general, state parties are not prevented from 
implementing additional health measures (art. 43 [1] IHR). 
However, the IHR are very clear: those additional measures 
may not be more restrictive on international traffic and not 
more intrusive on persons than reasonably available 
alternatives which achieve the appropriate level of health 
protection. If a state wants to adopt additional measures, 
this state has to provide the WHO with corresponding 
information. The WHO, in turn, assesses these measures and 
may request the state to reconsider its plans. If a state plans 
to adopt measures contrary to temporary recommendations 
already in place, those measures would contravene the 
condition set at the end of art. 43 (1). Nevertheless, under 
international law, those national measures remain in force; 
the IHR cannot void any national measure. Still, the state is 
under a treaty obligation to report such measures. Thus, this 
requirement may nudge the state to adhere to the 
temporary recommendation. To be perfectly clear: This is in 
no way a legal enforcement mechanism; it may work for 
policy reasons only.
Moving sophisticatedly: Human rights law as catalyst
Unfortunately, the human right to health has not played any 
role in the fight against Ebola. It may nevertheless be the 
most comprehensive approach to use human rights law as a 
catalyst and ensure compliance with the IHR and temporary 
recommendations. This approach relies on several pillars. BACK TO TOP 
First, art. 12 (1) International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) does not contain a right to 
perfect health, but it stipulates a somewhat lesser goal to the 
“enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health”. Art. 12 (2) ICESCR indicates several steps 
that State parties shall take to achieve full realization of this 
right. Among those is the state parties’ obligation to refrain 
from interfering directly or indirectly with this right, and to 
render international assistance and cooperation. In addition 
to bilateral and multilateral cooperation trough the WHO, 
the UN General Assembly is also tasked with promoting 
international cooperation in the field of health. Especially 
with PHEICs, international cooperation is key. Without a 
global effort, the global spread of diseases will not be 
stopped.
Second, the ICESCR does not contain a provision outlining 
the applicability ratione loci. One could make the case for 
applicability only in a State party’s territory. After all, it is 
difficult enough to provide health care within a State alone. 
If a State cannot provide perfect health to everyone on its 
territory, how can a State than achieve this goal abroad?
However, this interpretation falls short of treaty law. After 
all, art. 2 [1] ICESCR does not explicitly limit the ICESCR’s 
scope of application. In addition, this provision includes an 
obligation for providing international assistance and 
cooperation. By being under a treaty obligation to supply 
assistance, States may not hamper efforts by other actors to 
achieve health. Keeping in mind that such measures are 
taken (and enforced) on the state’s territory, this amounts to 
an obligation to at least not interfere with temporary 
recommendations issued by the WHO’s Director-General. 
To be clear, this does not entail an extraterritorial 
BACK TO TOP 
applicability of the ICESCR but refers to measures taken on 
the territory of the respective state. Taking such measures 
would, in contrast, lead to the contrary result because the 
state is not only not supplying international assistance, but 
hindering international assistance in the form of WHO-
recommended measures.
Given all this, taking the human rights approach is not as 
easy as it may sound. The obligation to render international 
assistance is rather weak and may be interpreted in various 
ways. In addition, art. 2 ICESCR simply does not provide for 
extraterritorial application and if one opts for the basic 
approach that such a provision is necessary in order to have 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the approach suggested here 
will not progressively realize the human right to health. If 
one, however, interprets the lack of any explicit reference to 
the scope of application as to not limit the ICESCR’s 
application (in contrast to art. 2 ICCPR), the way forward 
suggested here may be convincing. Still, the obligation to 
render international assistance itself is rather weak. Its 
substance is vague and may be interpreted in many ways.
Conclusion
In short, the obligation to progressively realize the rights 
enshrined in the ICESCR in cooperation with other States as 
well as the obligation to assist other States in their endeavor 
to provide the human right to health are violated by the 
above-mentioned restrictions taken despite a temporary 
recommendation to the opposite.
While updating the IHR seems to be futile and taking a 
winding approach may not meet the target of providing 
“more health”, a human rights centered approach may be BACK TO TOP 
benficial to address the spread of global diseases. After all, 
the obligation to provide assistance to other States amounts 
simultaneously to an obligation not to interfere with 
measures taken by other States or the international 
community for this purpose.
Robert Frau is senior research associate at the European 
University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder). The above reflections 
will be published more detailed in the volume covering the 
workshop, where the role of the Security Council is addresses 
as well. In addition, the article “Law as an Antidote” will be 
published in the Göttingen Journal of International Law.
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